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Industry · Logistics · Vendor + Integration Security

Security for the TMS, ELD, and GPS stack.

The operational software that runs trucking (TMS, ELD telematics, GPS, and broker portals) sits at the third-party trust boundary. EFROS hardens the integration surface on your side, documents the vendor risk for your insurance and audit reviewers, and runs the response when a vendor itself gets breached.

TMS/ELD/GPS vendor blast radius

When a TMS or ELD vendor is breached, your drivers' HOS logs, your customers' lane history, and your dispatchers' credentials are exposed for the duration of the vendor's response window, which you do not control.

The hardening work happens on YOUR side of the integration: API token rotation, SSO+MFA wired through Conditional Access, mailbox forwarding alerts on the dispatcher mailboxes that authenticate to vendor portals, and a documented vendor-breach runbook that lets your insurance carrier and your auditors see what you did the moment the vendor disclosed. Vendor risk questionnaire.

Where the integration risk lives.

01

TMS vendor breach

Your transportation management system runs in someone else's tenant. When the vendor's environment is breached, your driver, customer, and rate data is exposed without you controlling the response window.

02

ELD telematics integration leakage

ELD vendors push driver duty-status and location data through API integrations that route through dispatch consoles. Weak API auth or stale tokens become attacker pivots into the operational stack.

03

GPS account hijack

GPS provider accounts often share credentials across dispatchers. One phished login exposes the entire fleet's real-time position and routing history.

04

Mailbox forwarding from vendor portal

Compromised mailboxes set up auto-forwarding rules to vendor-portal addresses, then trigger password resets on TMS/ELD/GPS accounts to chain access laterally.

05

Vendor SSO misalignment

TMS and ELD vendors offer SSO, but it's rarely wired to Conditional Access. The end result is MFA on M365 but no MFA on the systems that matter most for operations.

06

Audit-evidence gaps

Insurance carriers and SOC 2 auditors increasingly ask for evidence of third-party vendor risk reviews. Without a documented vendor inventory and access review, the questionnaire stalls.

Which TMS changes need a second look

Not every click in the TMS carries the same risk. Viewing a load is routine. These changes are how fraud happens, so we watch them closely:

  • bank or payment details
  • carrier profiles and contacts
  • reroutes and load status changes
  • customer contacts
  • user permissions and new accounts

Combined with a second login check, separate roles and logs that someone actually reads, an unusual change gets looked at the same night, not at month-end.

Old vendor connections and API keys

Your TMS talks to load boards, ELD providers, factoring companies, fuel programs and customer portals through connections that run on keys and service accounts. Those keys often outlive the project, the vendor or the person who set them up.

We keep one list of every connection: what it does, what it can access, when it expires, and who on your side owns it. Each key gets only the access it needs, old ones are rotated or removed, and the list is reviewed whenever a vendor, an employee or a system changes. We test removing access before we do it, so dispatch, billing and driver messages keep working.

When a driver leaves: the tablet checklist

A driver's last shift should not leave their access behind. One trigger (a resignation, a termination, a transfer, a new tablet) starts the same steps every time:

  • Turn off the driver's logins and end active sessions.
  • Remove their access to dispatch apps and messaging.
  • Locate the tablet by serial number or asset tag.
  • Lock it, wipe it, or prepare it for the next driver.
  • Decide what happens to the SIM or eSIM.

If a tablet is still in a truck on the road, that is written down and followed up, not forgotten in a spreadsheet.

What's included.

  • Vendor inventory of every TMS, ELD, GPS, and broker portal in use
  • Third-party vendor risk questionnaire intake and tracking
  • API auth review (where vendor APIs feed dispatch consoles)
  • SSO / SAML / OIDC integration to Microsoft 365 identity
  • Conditional Access policies extended to vendor portals where supported
  • Privileged account review for shared dispatcher logins
  • Mailbox forwarding rule monitoring + alerting (BEC indicator)
  • Quarterly vendor access review with documented evidence
  • Vendor breach response runbook (containment + comms)
  • Cyber-insurance vendor-risk evidence pack

FAQ.

Do you do penetration testing of our TMS / ELD / GPS vendors?

No. Testing third-party vendor environments requires explicit authorization from the vendor and is a separate engagement we coordinate but do not execute unilaterally. What we do is harden the integration surface on your side and document the residual vendor risk for your insurance and audit reviewers.

Our dispatchers share a GPS provider login. Is that fixable?

Yes, if the GPS vendor offers per-user accounts (most major providers do as of 2026). The work is splitting the shared account into named users, wiring SSO where supported, and documenting any residual shared-credential exposure in the vendor risk register.

What happens if our TMS vendor has a breach?

We have a vendor-breach runbook ready: contain the exposed credentials on your side, audit recent API calls, force password resets on tied accounts, alert your cyber-insurance carrier, and document the timeline. Most of this is pre-authorized, so we can start within the first hour rather than waiting for an emergency contract.